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Abstract
The epic failure of fixed public housing projects supports the paradigm that poverty concentration
makes poverty and the cycle of poverty intractable. Moreover, neoliberal, free-enterprise theorists
interrogate the viability of the state as a provider of social goods and services and press the need
for market-based schemes such as housing vouchers. However, how do you de-concentrate the
poor voluntarily without government dictating residential choice? This article reports the results
of the first ten years of a policy experiment leveraging a mobile voucher program to attempt to
achieve voluntary dispersion and de-concentration of the poor in Phoenix, Arizona. Using
Phoenix’s 308 census tracks as of 1998 as units of analysis, and examining the locational choices
of the 5,139 families that received mobile housing vouchers between 1998 and 2009, this study
finds that, although mobile voucher recipients dispersed somewhat throughout the research period,
they were still geographically isolated in the southern poverty belt, housing mostly race and ethnic
minority populations at the end of the ten-year period. The data suggest that race/ethnicity and
patterns of residential segregation may hold some of the key to de-concentration. Ultimately, the
level of de-concentration does not support the broader theory that mobile vouchers hold the key to
poverty de-concentration.

Keywords: City of Phoenix, assisted housing, vouchers, poverty, poverty de-concentration,
poverty dispersion.

Introduction
President Trump’s controversial1 appointment of Michigan billionaire philanthropist and longtime
school choice advocate Betsy DeVos as his Education Secretary is rekindling policy debate about
the neoliberal, free-enterprise ideology of using mobile vouchers as a mechanism for poverty
mitigation in the United States. While DeVos’s confirmation hearing centered primarily on her
advocacy of school choice, which can be achieved in a myriad of ways,2 the politics of “choice”
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Her confirmation vote in the Senate was a 50/50 tie. Vice President Pence’s tiebreaking vote saved the
nomination.
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According to the National Council of State Legislatures, 27 states offered some form of school choice.
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during her confirmation hearings degenerated into a euphemism for allowing families to enroll
their children in schools of their choice using “mobile” federal funds provided through mobile
vouchers (Sard & Rice, 2016). Lianne Mulder (2018: 1) summarizes the theory succinctly:
“Neoliberal advocates argue that when schools face market-style pressures, this will force them to
compete, leading to improved school effectiveness and efficiency.” The underlying assumption is
that mobile vouchers will offer poor families the opportunity to “vote” with their feet (voucher
dollars) by shunning failing neighborhood schools and placing their children in better performing
schools, thereby providing a ‘market of sorts’ that makes education delivery more competitive and
efficient (Sard & Rice, 2016). Thus, “school choice options disconnect one’s address of residence
with the public school one must attend, making it possible for a child to attend a public school not
in its neighborhood” (Mulder, 2018: 1).
What makes this debate generally striking is that the modality of providing mobile
vouchers is not novel to poverty experts in the United States.3 In fact, it has not only featured
prominently in the enduring debate (even practical efforts) to remediate poverty and close the cycle
of poverty, but some would contend that it has become the last bastion of theorizing about poverty
alleviation (Fisher, 2015). Moreover, while the potential consequences of the provision of mobile
vouchers for children of poor families have always been under analysis (see Literature covered in
Mulder, 2018; Fisher, 2015), theorizing about the specific use of mobile vouchers to remediate
educational inequality as part of the genre of poverty alleviation policy instruments is a relatively
newer development. It “arose after economist Milton Friedman promoted the free market concept
of school choice in 1955 … (and was) consolidated in federal legislation when the No Child Left
Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001 promoted and supported charter schools” (Mulder, 2018: 1; see also
Jackson May, 2006). Neoliberal theories promoting the free-enterprise, market ideology has
dominated debate on poverty alleviation ever since (Mulder, 2018; Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, 2009). Not to be outdone, as advocacy for the neoliberal view of education has gained
in vigor, so has the persistent opposition against it, steered by Civil Rights groups and
organizations, teachers, parents, and even students themselves (Mulder, 2018: 1-2; Perlstein,
Semel, and Sadovnik, 2004). This opposition anchors on several factors, including the danger of
“commoditization” of education by placing it in the hands of unaccountable self-seeking profiteers,
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resource diversion from public schools to private charter schools and other educational outfits, and
disempowerment of teachers’ unions since private school teachers are not unionized.4
Provision of housing for the poor is one service domain where the use of mobile vouchers
has been prominently debated and applied broadly by the world’s industrialized nations (Dodson,
2006). Early assisted housing policies were formulated without regard to locational effects and
resulted in concentration of those with the greatest housing needs in the poorest subdivisions of
cities (Hays, 1985). Some analysts theorized that such concentration rekindled poverty and made
the cycle of poverty intractable (Guhahakurta and Mushkatel, 2002). Unavoidably, it was
suggested that dispersion of the poor offered the greatest opportunity for public policy to
effectively engage poverty in all of its facets (Park, 2013; Guhahakurta and Mushkatel, 2002;
Galster and Zobel, 1998; Holloway, et al. 1998; Utt, 1996; see also literature cited in Galster and
Killen, 1995). In 1998, the national mobile voucher system was designed and launched to
deconcentrate and decentralize poverty.5 However, the question of whether vouchers have been
successful in achieving this narrow task of dispersing poverty is still very much an active one.
Correspondingly, whether stigmatized populations are still clustered in the poorest neighborhoods
is still contested (Sard and Rice, 2016; Park, 2013; Roisman, 2008, 2000; Galster, 2003, 2000).6
It is clear that the quality of housing affects the lives of the people that live in the
neighborhood—as housing is an important component of a community’s overall wellbeing (Sard
& Rice 2016; Guhahakurta & Mushkatel, 2002; Roisman, 2000). The quality of a neighborhood
also is a significant predictor of resident welfare and community health: the housing quality of the
neighborhood improves many in the community benefit (Sard & Rice, 2016; Guhahakurta &
Mushkatel, 2002). Housing and its quality or condition is also linked to a larger package of
neighborhood and community services, which determines the quality of life for several generations
of families (Park, 2013; Hays, 1995). The social stratification of the population—based on class,
race and gender—tends to segment the housing markets into sub-markets (Hays, 1995).
Understanding the characteristics of the neighborhoods in which voucher users reside is essential,
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Mulder (2018) offers a comprehensive discussion of these opposition arguments, including active actions that
have been taken in the courts to challenge the neoliberal arguments.
5
For the purpose of this paper, we will use the word de-concentration to indicate an attempt to prevent all the
vouchers from being concentrated in one or more tracts (Mushkatel, 2000; Galster, 2001).
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There is also the question of what happens in the places the poor and racial minorities relocate to (Duncan and
Zuberi, 2006).
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as it will elucidate the nature of these submarkets and provide insight into how vouchers are
affecting the housing of those utilizing this policy tool. To better understand the effects of this
policy tool, it is important to understand how the populations with the least ability to compete for
limited resources use the voucher system. Specifically, we need to know if these housing policies
are meeting the needs of the target population and accomplishing their intended goals. If they are
not meeting the needs and accomplishing their intended goals, the policies can be “sunset” or
redesigned based on insights provided by the kind of assessment we report here.
Accordingly, this paper interrogates the outcome of the first ten years of one of the most
ambitious and expansive voucher policy initiatives in the United States: the City of Phoenix,
Arizona’s Mobile Housing Voucher Program (hereafter, PMHV). We focus on three specific
questions with broad theoretical and policy implications: 1) was PMHV successful in
deconcentrating poverty in Phoenix between 1998 and 2009? 2) To what extent did minority status
(race/ethnicity) impact the propensity to deconcentrate poverty? 3) Finally, what are the
implications for future policy aiming to deconcentrate poverty in Phoenix in particular?

The Setting: Phoenix, Poverty, and Poverty De-concentration
Located in Maricopa County with a projected population of 1.1 million in 1995, Phoenix is
Arizona’s largest city. Its over one million population places Phoenix within the category of large
American cities. Minorities constituted 40 percent of the population, with Hispanics at 35 percent
being the largest minority group. The median family income was $47,326, with 23.1 percent living
below the poverty line. Figure 1 suggests that Phoenix has important attributes that may set it apart
from some other major cities. In particular, it has a high level of residential segregation, where
poor African American and Hispanic populations live apart from whites, concentrated toward the
Figure 1. Phoenix Census Tracks Highlighting the Poverty Belt, 2010

5
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south central to southern part that we label as the poverty belt in this research.7 For Phoenix, then,
the question is not just whether or not housing voucher holders become mobile with their vouchers,
but whether they venture out of the poverty belt and, in so doing, de-concentrate poverty.
Goal, History, and Ideology of Assisted Housing Policy
As enunciated by successive administrations, the ideology and goal of the government assisted
housing program is and has been since the 1930’s, to provide “safe, decent, and sanitary housing,
for all Americans” (HUD, 2004). Assisted housing is designed to meet the needs of the very poor
in communities. The poor may be the disabled, elderly, women with children, those with mental
illness or families unable to earn a living wage. The recipients also need assistance obtaining food,
health care or other services that are necessary to meet their daily needs (HUD, 2004).
Governmental programs have applied a three-pronged approach to meeting the stated goal of
providing housing to the poor: they have provided low cost mortgages, public housing, and
incentives to the private sector to construct affordable housing. The history is complex. There is a
record of continuous struggle between site selection, the target population, funding, administration
and project design. In each of these areas, the political balance of forces created contradictory
pressures, making it difficult for the program to meet its objectives (Hays, 1985). To many, the
need for providing housing assistance and public housing to at risk populations is still as clear
today as it was in the mid 1800’s. The conditions today are certainly better than they were one
hundred and fifty years ago. However, the basic goal that was set with the first housing legislations
from the early 1930’s has not been met, as many still lack safe, decent, sanitary housing (Hays,
1985). However, more choices than ever are being offered. Beneficiaries select the communities
in which they would like to reside, providing them the opportunity to select a home in the areas
that will provide them and their families with the resources necessary for a better life.

Current Policies including Housing Choice Vouchers
According to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Rental Assistance (n.d.),
the Federal rental assistance programs operate in three basic ways currently:
•

Public housing. These units are owned by local public agencies.
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•

Project-based assisted housing. These programs support the construction and
rehabilitation of rental units.
• Tenant-based assisted housing- Section 8 certificate. These programs provide direct
rental assistance to households to enable them to find their own housing on the open
market.
In all three housing programs, assisted households pay rents that are a percentage of their adjusted
gross income—usually 30 percent. The subsidies are designed so that the poorest households can
live in assisted housing (HUD, 2009).
Housing Choice Vouchers
Housing policies initially directed the poor into project-based homes. President Kennedy signed
the Fair Housing Act of 1968; Executive Order 11063 in response to research that found that
assisted housing was contributing to residential segregation (Galster, 1999; Massey & Denton,
1993; Massey & Kanaiaupuni, 1993; Rohe & Freeman, 2001). Several court rulings underscored
the importance of dispersing race and ethnic minority populations through all neighborhoods. A
significant policy reversal came when the courts mandated in Gautreaux et al. v. Chicago Housing
Authority et al. (1967) that the Chicago Housing Authority had to end its policy of concentrating
public housing in minority and poor neighborhoods (Goetz, 1998). Another significant case was
Shannon et al. V. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (1970), in which
the court ruled that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and local public
housing authorities could no longer locate subsidized housing in only non-white areas (Goetz,
1998). In other words, the long practice of keeping those with the greatest needs concentrated in
the worst parts of the cities had to end. Minorities were clearly being segregated into the worst
neighborhoods and the courts recognized the problem.
The effects of project-based housing were problematic for the country. Those with the
greatest needs had been isolated in the poorest segments of our cities (Roisman, 2000). The racial
implications were clear and not acceptable. Administrators needed a way to provide assisted
housing that would disperse the poor throughout the cities. The Housing Choice Vouchers were a
direct response to this requirement. The first Housing Choice Vouchers -Section—8 were complex
to use because they required that the apartment managers be approved for acceptance into the
program. Once the units were approved for Section 8, those with the certificates could apply for
the units. The number of complexes that wished to be recognized as accepting Section 8
certificates was limited. However, families with vouchers could choose to live anywhere in the
city. The amount that they would be required to pay for housing was set based solely on their
8

income. The price that they would need to pay for housing would not vary depending on location.
Vouchers offered fewer geographic restrictions. According to the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, the Housing Choice Voucher Program, has become the dominant form of federal
housing assistance (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2009). Vouchers do not have fixed
unit sizes and can be matched to the size of the family. However, the vouchers are not available to
all families that need assistance. Housing vouchers increased ten-fold since the 1970’s (Duncan,
2000)—as section 8 certificate, then as vouchers.

The Theory of Mobile Vouchers: Sociology Meets Neoliberalism and Public Choice
Just like education, delivery of social housing since the 1970s has anchored on assumptions
embedded in neoliberalism theories—holding “as its most tenet that the most efficient means of
achieving an efficient distribution of social goods and services is through operation of markets
(Dodson, 2006: 1). As Dodson further notes, “this belief in the allocation superiority of markets is
accompanied by a skeptical assessment of government’s abilities to achieve social or collective
goods” (p.1). This has culminated in the general call for “rolling back” the role of the state.
Correspondingly, proponents of the mobile housing voucher program anchor their narrative on
public choice, making assumptions about both voucher recipients and the nature of the voucher
program itself. Specifically, voucher recipients are supposed to be rational actors who will act in
their own best interests when presented with the opportunity to better themselves and their
families. They will seek to maximize their benefits when presented with an opportunity to act on
their own behalf. In turn, the voucher program allows the recipients to rely on the private market
rather than the government to provide housing services (Duncan, 2000), as families choose their
own units on the open market (Goetz, 1998). Expectedly, voucher holders are anticipated to “vote”
with their mobile voucher dollars that offer them freedom in locational choice and cost less than
project-based programs. Ultimately, recipients are expected to locate in better neighborhoods, and
by way of Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’, disperse poverty, and eliminate the potential of
artificially concentrating poor families in areas of high poverty density (Shroder, 2002).
Opposition to voucher and its accompanying neoliberal economic theory has come from
several quarters (Civil Rights groups, teachers, parents, students, elected officials), rejecting the
strict constructionism of economic determinism and injecting broader sociological imperatives.
Applying the group identity theory, for instance, some analysts have suggested that low-income
9

individuals may prefer to live in neighborhoods that have others of similar economic and racial
background even though there may be increased employment opportunities and better educational
opportunities elsewhere (Hartung & Henig, 1997; Rosenbaum & Popkin, 1991; Popkin,
Rosenbaum & Meaden, 1993). The poor will opt to stay because they obtain much of their social
identity within such settings—to the extent that class modalities differ. In other words, there are
more factors involved in the cost-benefit calculation of the poor than mere economics. Other
researchers worry that simply moving the family to a new neighborhood does not vitiate their
worldview or modus operandi—codified in some circles as the “culture of poverty”. The belief is
that someone nurtured within the culture of poverty will inculcate that culture and convey it to the
new neighborhood (Rosenbaum, 2002). From the neighborhoods themselves, middle class
communities fear that there will be an increase in social problems in their neighborhoods, lower
property values, and an eroding of the overall quality of life (Galster, 1998; Guhathakurta &
Mushkatel, 2000; Galster, 1998; Holloway, 1998).
Viewing things from the completely practical reality of the poor, Shroder (2002) found that
assisted housing families had trouble using the vouchers and may not even understand the housing
opportunities that are available to them. Some families do not have the confidence needed to
approach agencies in the most established areas. The vouchers require the families to enter into a
lease agreement. The private owner may not feel comfortable renting the unit to the family
(Shroder, 2002), or the family may not meet the credit worthiness necessary to qualify for the
lease. Some believe that the use of Section 8 certificates and vouchers has reduced the racial and
economic impacts of assisted housing (Goering et al., 1995; Goering, Kanely & Richardson, 1997;
Judd, 1997). However, others are convinced that residential segregation of the poor is still
prevalent in some areas (Roisman, 2000). They believe that vouchers create “horizontal poverty,”
and are still clustering the voucher recipients in low-income neighborhoods in conditions that are
similar to public housing (Roisman, 2000).

Identifying Those in Greatest Need of Housing Assistance
The association between the location of public housing and poor neighborhoods has been widely
studied (Taeuber & Taeuber, 1965; Goering, Kamely & Ridson, 1994; Wilson, 1987; Massey &
Denton, 1993; Massey & Kanaiaupuni, 1993; Galster, 2002; Mushkatel & Guhahakurta, 2000).
Gramlich (1992) found that neighborhoods in poor areas have many problems associated with
10

them. The poor neighborhoods often lack employment opportunities and have schools that
perform marginally. The employment that are available in such neighborhoods often are found to
be in limited supply and offer low wages. There is also the perception (substantiated or not) that
the neighborhoods are unsafe resulting in the residents being less willing to take late-night
employment or work the evening shift. Assisted housing recipients that are integrated into the
community are able to obtain better jobs due to increased opportunities and may be able move to
self-sufficiency (Rosenbaum, 1990). Gramlich (1992) also notes that the neighborhood schools in
these areas frequently perform marginally and the children receive poor education. Teachers are
often paid more in the suburban areas and their students have better achievement and fewer
dropouts (Rosenbaum, 1990). Children from suburban areas are also more likely to attend college,
be on college tracks in high school, and have higher college entrance scores. These low educational
levels contribute to low social mobility and entrench the cycle of poverty. In response, federal
housing policy has focused on dispersing subsidized families in order to break this cycle of poverty
(Goetz, 2003).
Housing constitutes the largest expense item on families’ budgets each month (Miller,
2002). Approximately 20 percent of middle to low-income households in the United States live
in substandard housing and pay more than half of their income in housing costs (Miller, 2002).
With such a significant portion of income allocated to housing, the need for low cost, affordable
housing is well known (Miller, 2002). The meager wages earned by the working poor make it
difficult for them to afford most of the available housing—at the same time that affordable housing
is seldom available that meets the needs of the working family. In fact, housing is now considered
an important part of work support programs such as food stamps, childcare, Medicaid, child
support enforcement, Earned Income Tax Credit, and the child tax credit (Miller, 2002). Over time
we have developed a better understanding of the complexities of providing assisted housing. We
now understand that coordinating several social services can be necessary in providing housing.
There is a long history of struggles between site selection, the target population, funding,
administration and project design. In each of these areas, the political balance of forces created
contradictory pressures, making it difficult for the program to meet its objectives (Hays, 1985).
While these programs work to assist low income families in obtaining housing, waiting lists are a
chronic problem. Five to ten-year waiting lists for housing assistance are not unusual (Miller,
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2002). Waiting lists this long act as a barrier to families, which struggle constantly to make ends
meet and cannot wait five to ten years for answers.
Based on the foregoing, our data analysis is anchored around two broad questions: 1) was
PMHV successful in deconcentrating poverty in Phoenix between 1998 and 2009 2) To what
extent did minority status (race/ethnicity) impact the propensity to deconcentrate poverty in
Phoenix between 1998 and 2009 using PMHV?

Data and Methodology
The information and data used in this analysis were provided by the City of Phoenix’s Housing
Department. The Department provided the full data files for all recipients of housing voucher from
the initiation of the program in 1998 to 2009, marking the 10-year anniversary of the program.
These data files contained information about the number of family members, race, ethnicity and
gender of the head of household. We wanted to evaluate the program in its first full decade. Ten
years allows all mobile voucher users enough time to settle and resettle in places of their choice
several times across the city.
The data we have are largely descriptive, but enough to address the questions we are asking.
Methodologically, these data permit descriptive analyses that aggregate voucher holders’
movements in groups across Census Tracks. Such clustering then permits tracking of voucher
holders’ movements across both space and time. These two realities combine to necessitate the
two-prong methodology we applied in the study. The first is the use of summative descriptive
statistics to weigh and track group locational choice in both space and time. The second is the use
of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to show the spatial patterns of group locational choices,
also in both space and time. GIS is an expansive computer data-based system widely applied in
urban and many other kinds of research endeavors to “map” subjects such as immigration and
mass population movements of people, distribution of housing across space, and other kinds of
matters associated with distribution. The common feature of GIS as a tool for research is that it is
a digital mapping that displays data on phenomena relative to positioning on Earth’s surface. Thus,
GIS can be used, appropriately, to map the locational choice of voucher holders across both space
and time in the City of Phoenix comprised of Census Tracks spatially distributed. While GIS can
show spatial patterns of human activity, it cannot explain such activity. Accordingly, our
application of GIS in this study to map the locational choice of voucher holders can show the
12

outcome of locational decisions, but it cannot explain them [see Star and Estes (1990) for further
explication of the GIS as a research tool].
Phoenix’s Housing Voucher Program
Phoenix offers several programs that provide housing to low-income residents. These programs
include Scattered Site housing, conventional public housing, senior and disabled housing, and
Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers. As Figure 2 shows, the Housing Choice Vouchers - Section
8 are not only the most common type of assisted housing offered by Phoenix once initiated in
1998, but it grew exponentially as other programs contracted. According to the data files from
Phoenix’s housing department, there were 3,682 voucher recipients when the program started in
1998. By 2004, that number had increased to 4,708. In 2009, it stood at 5,139, constituting 68
percent of the city’s entire assisted housing program. Phoenix follows federal policies and
procedures for operating the program, selecting recipients, landlords, as well as payment scales
(City of Phoenix, 2009). The Section 8 vouchers have an annual 6% turnover rate (City of Phoenix,
2004).
Figure 2. City of Phoenix Assisted Housing Programs 1998-2009
1998

2004

2009

Largest segment- Housing Choice Vouchers 57%, 66%, & 66%
Large segment- Conventional 27%, 20%, & 20%
Small segment- Senior 10%, 9%, & 9%
Smallest segment - Scattered Site 7%, 6%, & 6%
According to the 2000 Census, there were a total of 308 census tracks located within
Phoenix’s City limits when the voucher initiative was launched in 1998. Technically, each tract
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was available to mobile voucher holders. As noted above, our research covers the first decade of
the program, 1998-2009. While 1998 data may appear dated to some, the essence of our study does
not rise or fall on data dating. Rather, we wanted to place on record the holistic outcome of a major
policy experiment, starting from the inception of the experiment. We have three important
comparative points over the 10-year period. The first is the base year, 1998, at the start of the
initiative, followed by 2004, at its midpoint, and finally, 2009, at the end of the first 10-year cycle.
Our primary mode of analysis is Geographic Information System (GIS) cluster mapping. We use
these maps to track voucher locational choice at the margin across all 308 census tracks of the city.

Qualifying for, Getting, and Using the Phoenix Mobile Voucher
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provided the general
guidelines and modalities for the mobile voucher program at its inception, although actual
implementation was delegated to each locality (HUD, 2017). For Phoenix’s program, eligibility
for a housing voucher is determined by the City of Phoenix Housing Department (PHA). HUD’s
guidelines required that each family’s size and total income be considered, and, except for a few
exceptions, the program be limited to US citizens. To qualify for a voucher, a family's income
may not exceed 50% of the median income for Maricopa County or the Phoenix Metropolitan
Area. PHA was required to provide 75 percent of its vouchers to applicants whose incomes do
not exceed 30 percent of the Phoenix area median income. Median income levels applied are
published by HUD and vary by location (HUD, 2017).
Any low-income family selected by PHA to participate is encouraged to consider several
housing choices in securing the best housing for family needs. A housing voucher holder is
advised of the unit size for which he or she is eligible based on family size and composition. The
housing unit selected by the family must meet an acceptable level of health and safety before the
PHA can approve the unit. When the voucher holder locates a unit that he or she wishes to
occupy and reaches an agreement with the landlord over the lease terms, the PHA must inspect
the dwelling and determine that the rent requested is reasonable. The PHA determines a payment
standard that is the amount generally needed to rent a moderately-priced dwelling unit in the
local housing market and that is used to calculate the amount of housing assistance a family will
receive. However, the payment standard does not limit and does not affect the amount of rent a
landlord may charge or the family may pay. A family which receives a housing voucher can
14

select any unit in any area with a rent that is below or above the payment standard. The housing
voucher family must pay 30% of its monthly adjusted gross income for rent and utilities, and if
the unit rent is greater than the payment standard the family is required to pay the additional
amount. By law, whenever a family moves to a new unit where the rent exceeds the payment
standard, the family may not pay more than 40 percent of its adjusted monthly income for rent.
Findings
The basic statistics describing Phoenix’s voucher holders in 1998, 2004, and 2009 are displayed
in Table 1. As we have already noted, a total of 3,682 households participated in 1998, 4,708
participated in 2004, and 5,139 participated in 2009. As Table 1 indicates, 2,590 or
approximately 70 percent of the 3,682 households which participated in 1998 were classified as
headed by race and ethnic minorities. The figures for 2004 and 2009 are 3,178 (68%) and 3,620
(70%) respectively.

Table1. Summary Statistics for Phoenix Voucher Holders, 1998-2009
Description
Total Number of Recipients
White
Black
Hispanic
Other
Female Head of Household

1998
# Recipients
3,682
2,180
1,360
1,230
142
3,289

2004
# Recipients
4,708
2,886
1,600
1,578
254
3,919

2009
# Recipients
5,139
2,898
1,958
1,662
283
4,232

Source: Calculated from data from the City of Phoenix Housing Department.

Did Vouchers Deconcentrate Poverty in Phoenix Between 1998 and 2009?
Table 2 displays the conditions for perfect equal distribution of voucher recipients across the 308
census tracks between 1998 and 2009. In 1998, the condition of perfect equal distribution
required that approximately 12 voucher users reside in each census track. In 2004 that condition
moves to 15 while in 2009, it becomes approximately 17.
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Table 2. Conditions of Perfect Distribution of Phoenix Voucher Holders, 1998-2009
1998
Category

2004

2009

Vouchers Tracks

Vouchers

Tracks

Vouchers

Tracks

3,682

4,708

308

5,139

308

308

Ideal Distribution
12
15
Source: Calculated from data from the City of Phoenix Housing Department.
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Table 3. Phoenix Housing Choice Voucher Distribution by Census Tract, 1998-2009
# HCV
per Tract

1998
# Tracts

2004
# Tracts

2009
# Tracts

0
1 to 9
10 to 19
20 to 29
30 to 42
43 to 68
69 to 467

109
108
23
30
16
10
12

44
126
58
31
22
22
5

49
124
60
27
23
14
11

Totals
308
308
Source: Calculated from data from the City of Phoenix Housing Department.

308

The actual patterns of locational distribution of voucher holders in 1998, 2004, and 2009
are shown in Table 3. As Table 3 shows, in 1998, as many as 109 of the 308 tracks had no voucher
users whatsoever, while the figures for 2004 and 2009 are 44 and 49 respectively. The second row
of Table 3 reporting on the number of voucher holders resident in given tracks is equally insightful.
As at 1998, 108 of the 308 tracks had only 1-9 voucher users residing in them. Again, the data for
2004 and 2009 are 126 and 124 respectively. Taken together, these first two columns show that as
many as 217 of the 308 tracks had either no voucher resident or had only 1-9 families residing in
them. In 2004, the figure is 170 tracks, while in 2009 it is 173.
These numbers suggest, very clearly, that some movement occurred with voucher holders,
especially between the 1998-2004 periods. However, the numbers nevertheless suggest heavy
concentrations of voucher users in the remaining tracks. This distribution, where a great member
of tracks has very few or no voucher users and a few tracks have too many vouchers does not
support the expectation that vouchers would deconcentrate poverty appreciably overtime. Indeed,
16

the dispersion outcomes for the 2004 and 2009 period, where the gains of the 1998-2004 period
appeared to be reversing, makes that prospect even more doubtful.

Making these observations more meaningful, though, requires that they be situated within the
larger context of de-concentration of poverty away from the poverty belt. To address this, we
examine the GIS mapping of these dispersion data vis-à-vis the Phoenix poverty belt. These results
are shown in Figure 3 for 1998, 2004, and 2009. A comparison of these maps shows an initial
voucher movement toward the middle-belt and Northern Phoenix. By 2009, however, even with
the clearly visible movement toward the North, there seemed to be greater concentration in the
Southwestern poverty belt. Some voucher holders seemed to have located up North, away from
the poverty belt, while others are concentrated in the poverty south. Our data seem to be suggesting
that the real question with vouchers is not whether or not they will disperse the poor at the margin,
but whether sufficient dispersion will occur to eliminate poverty concentration appreciably. Our
data seems to suggest that the real question with vouchers is not whether or not working
exclusively on their own, vouchers will disperse the poor at the margin.

Tables 4 and Figure 4 display information about census tracks with the greatest voucher changes
within the study period. As shown in Table 4, there are 20 tracks (of the 308) that experienced
extreme growth and decline. Ten census tracts with the greatest growth combined to increase by
1,341 vouchers. Plus, two of these census tracts 1125.06 and 1166.01 grew by 765 housing choice
vouchers in eleven years. Conversely, the combined total of the 10 tracts with the greatest voucher
decline decreased by 764 voucher holders. The decreases were most notable in tracts 1123.02 and
1090.00. The two census tracts lost a total of 234 voucher users. These data are mapped in Figure
4, showing that these tracks are concentrated in the Southern portion of the city.
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Figure 3a. Distribution of Phoenix Voucher Holders 1998

18

Figure 3b. Distribution of Phoenix Voucher Holders 2004
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Figure 3c. Distribution of Phoenix Voucher Holders 2009
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Table 4a. Phoenix HCV Largest Tract Changes 1998-2009
Tract

1998

2009

Change

1143.02
1166.02
1055.00
1129.00
820.11
1074.00
1167.04

1
25
3
4
7
92
10

54
81
65
75
99
193
125

53
56
62
71
92
101
115

822.01
1125.06

0
30

126
235

126
205

1166.01

7

467

460

179

1,520

1,341

Total

Table 4b. Phoenix HCV Tracts with Largest Declines 1998-2009
Tract

1998

2009

Change

1123.02

130

10

-120

1090.00
1152.00
1096.02
1097.01
1125.04
1125.02
1072.01
1097.02
1123.01

157
127
117
110
75
69
71
53
56

43
37
30
25
13
10
15
7
11

-114
-90
-87
-85
-62
-59
-56
-46
-45

Total

965

201

-764

Source: Calculated from data from the City of Phoenix Housing Department.

.
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Figure 4. Phoenix HCV Largest Tract Changes 1998-2009
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We suspected that the patterns of Phoenix’s residential segregation, where poor race and
ethnic minority populations are concentrated in the Southern poverty belt and whites in the
Northern corridor may hold some of the answer to patterns of dispersion achieved with vouchers
between 1998 and 2009. Our preliminary suspicion is the prospect that white voucher holders may
be the ones principally locating toward the middle-belt and up North, while minorities
concentrated more in the poverty belt. To examine this possibility, we now turn to the analysis for
minority status.

Did Minority Status Impact the Extent of De-concentration between 1998 and 2009?
The data on the distribution of Non-Hispanic minority voucher holders between 1998 and 2009
are displayed in Table 5. The data in Table 5 show that 159 tracks had no voucher holders in 1998.
However, by 2004 and 2009, that number had declined to 84 tracks each. Again, this suggests
movement by voucher holders. When the second column, tracks housing 1-5 families is
considered, the picture of sparse distribution of voucher holders becomes clearer. In 1998, 230 or
75% of the 308 census tracks had either no voucher holders at all or had 1-5 holders. In 2004, 210
or 68% of the tracks had none, or 1-5 voucher holders, in 2009, 211 or 68% fell into that category.
This means the bulk of Non-Hispanic voucher holders resided in 25% of the tracks in 1998, 32%
in 2004, and 31% in 2009.

Table 5. Distribution of Phoenix Non-Hispanic Minority Voucher Holders, 1998-2009
# Race Minority
per Tract
0
1 to 5
6 to 11
12 to 18
19 to 25
26 to 42
43 to 333
Total

1998
# Tracts
159
71
38
14
13
7
6
308

2004
#Tracts
84
126
45
32
9
9
3
308

2009
# Tracts
84
127
51
21
13
6
6
308

Source: Calculated from data from the City of Phoenix Housing Department.
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Figure 5a. Distribution of Phoenix Non-Hispanic Minority Voucher Holders, 1998
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Figure 5b. Distribution of Phoenix Non-Hispanic Minority Voucher Holders 2004
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Figure 5c. Distribution of Phoenix Non-Hispanic Minority Voucher Holders 2009
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To get a better sense of this dispersion vis-à-vis the poverty belt, we again return to GIS cluster
mapping. The results are shown in Figure 5. These data suggest less movement away from the
poverty belt compared to the results shown in Figure 3. As the third map in Figure 5 shows, there
was greater concentration in the poverty belt in 2009 than there was in 2004.
The last group of analysis examined Hispanic voucher holders as a group. We thought such
an analysis was warranted given that Hispanics are the single largest minority group within the
City of Phoenix, comprising as much as 35 percent of the total population in 1995. As can be seen
in Table 1, there were a total of 1,230 Hispanic voucher holders resident in Phoenix in 1998, 33
percent of the total. That number increased by 432 in 2009, to 1,578 or 34 percent of the total. By
2009, another 84 had been added, for a total of 1,662 or 32 percent of the total recipients for that
year. The data shown in Table 6 for Hispanic voucher holders largely mirrors the trajectory already
depicted for Non-Hispanic minorities in Table 5. Essentially, many census tracks housed none to
four Hispanic voucher holders, while a great many of the holders concentrated in a few tracks. By
2009, 39 percent of all Hispanic voucher holders lived in only 13 census tracks.
Table 6. Distribution of Phoenix Hispanic Minority Voucher Holders 1998-2009
# Hispanics

1998

2004

2009

HCVR per Tract

# Tracts

# Tracts

# Tracts

0

153

84

98

1 to 4

83

119

109

5 to 9

30

51

49

10 to 14

17

23

28

15 to 19

10

20

11

20 to 37

10

7

7

38 to 137

5

4

6

308

308

308

Totals

Source: Calculated from data from the City of Phoenix Housing Department.
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Figure 6a. Distribution of Phoenix Hispanic Minority Voucher Holders 1998
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Figure 6b. Distribution of Phoenix Hispanic Minority Voucher Holders 2004

29

Figure 6c. Distribution of Phoenix Hispanic Minority Voucher Holders 2009
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Figure 6 displays these patterns of distribution relative to the poverty belt. These maps not only
show little concentration away from the poverty belt, but the result for 2009 suggests greater
concentration in the southwestern poverty belt. Taken together, the results of the analyses for both
Non-Hispanic and Hispanic minorities suggests that our initial suspicion that much of the
movement that took place away from the southern poverty belt was by white voucher holders was
indeed the case. By implication, then, our theoretical expectation that patterns of race and ethnic
minority residential segregation may partly hold the key to how much is achieved in poverty deconcentration by mobile vouchers takes center stage.

Implications for Non-liberalism, Vouchers, and Poverty Dispersion
Facing a national poverty rate of 19 percent, President Lyndon B. Johnson appeared before a joint
session of Congress on Wednesday, January 8, 1964 in a multi-prong State of the Union address
on poverty, which became known unofficially as “The War on Poverty”. More than five decades
after Johnson’s spirited alarm against poverty, poverty is still endemic in American life. While
billions of funds, both public and private, have been expended on poverty alleviation stretching
from health and nutrition to housing and elimination of the cycle of poverty, many believe that
these efforts largely speak to the universal need to secure a minimum level of livelihood, including
both a minimum level of consumption and providing a roof over people’s heads. At root, the
question of how to eliminate poverty remains not only in policy circles, but among policy and
urban scholars in particular. With the spectacular failure of public housing projects that
concentrated poverty and made eradication of inter-generational poverty impossible (Utt 1996),
buttressing the growth of neoliberal ideology and skepticism about the veracity of the state as a
direct provider of social goods and services (Dodson, 2006), attention shifted to making the poor
mobile through administration of mobile vouchers.
The theory of mobile vouchers suggests that providing “mobile money” to the poor will
change lives. Taking its fundamental assumptions from the literature of public choice that people
will seek to maximize their self-interests when given the opportunity to decide, the theory expects
vouchers to provide the push the poor need to vacate deteriorating neighborhoods since it allows
them to live any place they choose within the city. This mechanism of essentially “voting with
their mobile funds” should de-concentrate poverty and impact the culture of poverty. In 2009
alone, 1.6 million vouchers were issued nationwide. While the theory of vouchers has received
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wide acclaim and considerable resources have been expended in furthering it, there is no agreement
on the net effect of vouchers vis-à-vis poverty de-concentration. At best, the available evidence is
mixed, although the weight of that evidence is clearly beginning to swing to the negative direction.
The research we have reported here examines the distributional outcomes of the
voucher program initiated by the City of Phoenix in 1998. The research asks three basic questions:
1) was the phoenix Mobile Housing Voucher program successful in deconcentrating poverty in
Phoenix between 1998 and 2009? 2) To what extent did minority status (race/ethnicity) impact the
propensity to deconcentrate poverty? 3) Finally, what are the implications for future policy aiming
to deconcentrate poverty in Phoenix in particular? Our findings are insightful. First, on the question
of de-concentration of poverty in the city in its first 10 years of operation, from 1998 to 2009, our
data suggest that, as theorized, redistribution of voucher holders occurred largely at the margin.
However, answering the question as to whether that redistribution meant de-concentration of
poverty provides a disappointing answer. Much of the movement observed in the data occurred
within Phoenix’s poverty belt itself, as voucher holders moved within it. Much lesser location was
seen outside the poverty belt. Quite simply, the extent of redistribution was not enough to warrant
a conclusion that voucher holding de-concentrated poverty.
Regarding the second question, #2, on the relevance of minority status to the propensity to
deconcentrate poverty, the data suggest that a complex interaction of race/ethnicity and residential
segregation may be at play. Essentially, as a group, poor whites with Housing Vouchers tended to
migrate more away from the poverty belt with high concentrations of race/ethnic minorities,
toward the more affluent parts of the city with higher concentrations of whites. It is not that
race/ethnic minorities with Housing Vouchers did not move. They did, but not away from the
poverty belt. They only tended to relocate within it, ultimately negating the broader expectation
that they would vacate the poverty belt. This outcome is consistent with the results of the wellknown Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program in Chicago.
These findings have important implications for public policy and that brings us to the third
and final question on the implications for future public policy aiming to deconcentrate poverty in
Phoenix in particular (Question #3). While, given research convention on external validity, we do
not attempt to generalize these findings to other cities and, indeed, do not construe the value of the
findings as necessarily hinging on such generalization, we do see very important policy
implications, some of which parallel what is already known. In fact, we are willing to accept the
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uniqueness of the City of phoenix that may skew the result of the questions we have asked,
especially with the geographical distribution of the minority populations and the nature of
residential segregation. However, what is not in doubt is the fact that the answers to our questions
have relevance far beyond the City of Phoenix as a jurisdiction. The Phoenix poor Voucher holders
did not move in droves out of the poverty belt, as the theory suggested. The policy implication of
this finding ultimately lies with answering the question as to why they did not “exit” the poverty
belt. Obviously, one cannot accept the seemingly simple de-constructivist narrative that Voucher
holders are irrational actors who would not use Vouchers to “better” their circumstances. Quite to
the contrary, it appears that a broader mix of factors are at play, leading to the clear observation
that, as well-meaning and as theorized as Vouchers may be, simply handing them to the poor is
not enough. Policymakers must understand the complex set of factors facing the average Voucher
holder decision maker as he or she contemplates the decisive question of whether to relocate their
families, sometimes from the very living environments that have defined generations of their
family members. This, alone, calls into question the veracity of the neoliberal stance on the
viability of mobile vouchers.
It is clear that the broad sociological imperatives enumerated earlier in the study,
particularly the fact that the poor may opt to stay in neighborhoods that have others of similar
socio-economic background as part of both social solidarity and obtaining services that merely
holding the Voucher and obtaining housing elsewhere will not necessarily guarantee. Indeed, this
also seems to explain the patterns of movement noted earlier in the study between poor white
Voucher holders and poor race/ethnic minority voucher holders, with the latter opting to remain in
the poverty belt with high concentrations of members of their race/ethnic minority groups. There
is also the matter of the level of information Voucher holders have as to the potential benefits of
Vouchers and their sophistication (level of education and self-confidence) to approach landlords
in the more affluent areas of town since they are required to negotiate lease agreements by
themselves. These are qualitative matters that, if pursued with face-to-face interviews, could have
further clarified our findings. Unfortunately, because of family privacy issues, City Officials would
not provide information that could lead to the identification of individual Voucher holders. Nor
would they have permitted such contacts as part of the arrangement to release the data we analyzed
here. What is clear from a policy perspective is that, for Vouchers to have any chance of
deconcentrating poverty, more needs to be understood about the circumstances of the poor,
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including the pertains of residential segregation already underlined in this study. Moreover, there
may also be a level of active “help” required to get the poor to understand the benefits of Vouchers
and getting housing elsewhere. This is where Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum’s (2000) epic findings
on the comparison of the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) Housing Program and the Gautreaux
Voucher Program in Chicago becomes instructive. Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum found that
Gautreaux’s Court-ordered program actively involved program managers in the placement of
voucher recipients outside the poverty and race concentrated parts of town and that became the
catalyst for family relocation. On the contrary, the MTO program did not exercise such an active
control. Neither were voucher holders provided specific guidance about relocation. Consequently,
MTO voucher recipients stayed in low income neighborhoods closer to their original homes rather
than move to the more affluent Chicago suburbs.
We expected this research to add to the body of evidence on the efficacy of vouchers. We
also expected that the research would contribute insights that may aid further theorizing and
clarification of the potential benefits of vouchers. We achieved both. Two significant messages are
apparent for public policy: 1) The poor will not relocate out of the poverty belt or failed
neighborhoods just because they have vouchers that say they can do so. This policy outcome is
consistent with the outcome of the MTO program. Additional “active” measures may be required
to make vouchers viable as an instrument of dispersing the poor. 2) Race/ethnicity and residential
segregation may hold part of the answer to untangling the veracity of vouchers on poverty deconcentration in residentially segregated communities. The results of the Gautreaux program are
consistent with this conclusion. Finally, we must note that our research has concentrated on only
one side of the poverty mobility equation: those moving. That is by design. However, there is the
additional focus on the impact on receiving neighborhoods where, as research has suggested, a
myriad of economic and sociological issues must be considered (Duncan and Zuberi, 2006).8 Both
sides of this equation must be addressed for both the veracity of neoliberal arguments about
poverty alleviation and the final chapter on poverty de-concentration to be written. Overall, it is
clear that the jury is still out on the question of the viability of dispersing the poor as a mechanism
for tackling poverty.

8

Duncan and Zuberi (2006) provides an excellent discussion on these issues.
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